Tuesday, 29 March 2016

Applicants sought - EU Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships

The Department is seeking applications from researchers with a PhD (or at least 4 years’ full-time research experience) to apply for an EU Marie SkÅ‚odowska-Curie Individual Fellowship. In all cases, the fellowship must involve an element of mobility (specified below).  
  • European Fellowships are held in EU Member States or Associated Countries and are open to researchers either coming to Europe or moving within Europe.  European fellowships are 12-24 months in length. To apply for a fellowship with York, you must not have been based in the UK for more 12 months of the 3 years preceding the call deadline (14/09/2016).
  • Global Fellowships are based on a secondment to a third country and a mandatory 12 month return period to a European host.  Global Fellowships are 12 to 24 months for the outgoing phase, plus 12 months for the return phase in Europe.  To apply for a fellowship with York, you must be an EU / Associated country national or have been resident in the UK for 5 years or more. You must also have spent you must not have spent more than 12 months of the 3 years preceding the call deadline (14/09/2016) in the third country.
In order to be considered, please submit the following documents to Ed Kirby (ed.kirby@york.ac.uk) by 4pm on Friday 27th May:
  • A copy of your CV (following the Marie-Curie Individual Fellowship guidelines – see p. 41 of the guide available here) 
  • A two page outline of the proposed research project
  • Up to 1 page on your proposed mentor, your reasons for this choice and the wider fit between your project and the Department 
It is recommended that you contact your proposed mentor in advance of applying. If you have any questions regarding the process please contact Ed Kirby.

Wednesday, 24 February 2016

The place of financial services in TTIP negotiations

In this policy brief commissioned by Policy Network, Lucia Quaglia examines the place of financial services in TTIP negotiations, highlighting the surprising fact that the US authorities are less keen than the EU authorities on regulatory cooperation in the field of financial services for fear of lower standards. Her paper was disseminated at an event on TTIP organised by Policy Network on 25 February in London. Several policy makers, including Commissioner Malmstrom attended the event. See here for further information: http://www.policy-network.net/news_detail.aspx?ID=4074

Professor Lucia Quaglia provides evidence to the House of Lords

In February Professor Lucia Quaglia gave evidence to the House of Lords Sub-Committee for Economic and Financial Affairs for the preparation of an inquiry on Economic and Monetary Union. The session discussed: the completion of Banking Union and in particular the setting up of a common deposit guarantee scheme and a fiscal backstop; the completion of Economic and Monetary Union and in particular the need for a mechanism for macroeconomic counter cyclical stabilisation, economic policy coordination and fiscal transfers; the external representation of the euro area; the implications of Banking Union and Economic and Monetary Union for euro area outsiders.

Further details can be found at: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/eu-financial-affairs-subcommittee/news-parliament-2015/lilico-quaglia-marsh-evidence-session/





Wednesday, 10 February 2016

WHY THE LEAVE CAMPAIGN IS LIKELY TO LOSE



Events over the last few days should have put a spring in the step of the euro-sceptics in Britain. The recent draft paper setting out the basic parameters of David Cameron’s renegotiation deal was savaged by the press last week.[i] A YouGov poll for The Times on the weekend put the Leave campaign nine points in front (although research was carried out on line and such a methodology proved to be problematic during last year’s general election). More generally, the European Union (EU) is perceived by many to be in crisis, buffeted by the twin threats of sovereign debt default (especially in Greece) and large scale migration from the Middle East. On the face of it, it looks like a difficult time to be a supporter of Britain’s continued membership of the EU.

However, there are a number of reasons why the Remain campaign ought to be quietly confident going into a referendum campaign which looks set to take place sometime this summer. First, for all the disparagement that Cameron’s renegotiation deal has received, the details of this agreement are unlikely to remain a key feature of the debate for long. Most members of the public are probably unaware of the precise terms of this so-called ‘new settlement’, and are unlikely to be able to make an informed judgement about its merits. To make this point, is not to imply the British public is stupid. Rather, such a judgment would require extensive knowledge of the workings of the EU: knowledge that even the most diligent and conscientious person would find difficult to work up before the plebiscite. As soon as the campaign begins, it is likely to quickly default to a discussion of the costs and benefits of EU membership for Britain more generally. 

As and when this happens, the Remain camp will be on much stronger ground. Despite complaints of red tape from a bureaucratic Brussels, recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data has demonstrated that Britain’s product markets are the second least regulated in the EU (after the Netherlands) and its labour market regulation is comparable with non-EU countries such as the US, Canada and Australia.[ii] Membership of the EU has helped Britain to increase trade in goods with those countries that are members of this organisation, while at the same time increasing its attractiveness as a destination for foreign direct investment. While much still needs to be done to complete the Single Market in services (the service sector makes up about three quarters of the UK economy) progress towards this goal is likely to be even slower if Britain leaves the EU. Euro-sceptics underestimate the difficulties of forging trade deals in a post-Brexit world. A previous enthusiasm for a multilateral approach to trade negotiations at the global level appears lately to have given way to a preference for bi-lateral deals. Britain’s economy is already comparatively open, meaning it would have relatively little leverage in such an environment.

Conversely, the Leave camp is divided concerning the best focus for their arguments. Leave.EU (supported by UKIP’s leader Nigel Farage) wants to focus on the threat of immigration from the EU. Vote Leave (a cross-party grouping supported by Douglas Carswell, UKIP’s only MP) wants to focus on the economic argument for Brexit, suggesting the UK could successfully become a Singapore style off-shore financial centre (open to capital and migration). Relations between the two groups are not good and barring the occurrence of a significant development, the chances of the two uniting behind a common campaign do not look promising. Instead, it looks increasingly likely that Vote Leave will become the group to lead the official Leave campaign.   

If the euro-sceptics are organisationally divided, they also remain unclear precisely what Brexit will mean for Britain in practice. Some support the idea that the UK should try and retain complete membership of the Single Market after Britain leaves the EU (the Norwegian option). Alternatively, London could negotiate individual agreements in preferred sectors, in a sort of ‘pick ‘n’ mix’ fashion (the Swiss Option). However, as critics have noted, if Britain wants full or even partial access to the Single Market it would still have to accept EU regulations as part of the deal, yet would now have no influence over the content of these rules. Other argue that Britain should quit the Single Market altogether and use its membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to open up trade with the EU. While the WTO has helped to bring down barriers to trade in goods, it has been much less successful when it comes to opening up international markets in services. None of these arguments seem to demonstrate convincingly that Brexit would allow Britain to gain greater control over its economic future.

Finally, while it is true that the British press has become notably more euro-sceptic since the 1990s, there are reasons to question how much influence this section of the media will have on the referendum result. Research suggests that the majority of the electorate is as likely to get their political news from the television or the radio. Of course the coverage of current affairs programmes on these media outlets can be influenced by articles in euro-sceptical newspapers.  But TV and radio journalism is constrained by a legal requirement to provide political balance. This constraint is likely to at least partially negate the impact of papers like The Sun, The Mail or The Express on public sentiment.

Of course, there is a long way to go and it would be a brave person to predict the result of the referendum this far in advance. At the time of writing, Boris Johnson has yet to declare his hand, and his support has the potential to dramatically alter the fortunes of the Leave campaign which currently lacks a really high profile leader. However, it remains the fact that the Leave campaign has to sell change. And if it is to sell change successfully it needs to be united around an alternative course of action, and clear that this alternative is better than the status quo. At the moment, it has failed to demonstrate either. Until it does so, it is likely to lose the vote when it takes place.    

Post by Dr Jim Buller



[i] See my colleague Sofia Vasilopoulou’s recent comments at: https://theconversation.com/a-deal-half-sealed-eu-plan-waters-down-some-of-britains-demands-54063 
[ii] J. Springford, S. Tilford and P. Whyte (2014) The Economic Consequences of the Leaving the EU (London: Centre for European Reform) pp. 43-44

Tuesday, 17 November 2015

Lucia Quaglia hints at “a convoluted decision-making process” on banking resolution

Speaking on the sidelines of a talk given at Scuola Normale Superiore in Palazzo Strozzi (Florence), Lucia Quaglia, Professor of Political Science at the University of York (UK) reviewed the entangled governance of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), and stressed that ‘the most convoluted part of the process is how to take decisions within the Single Resolution Board’. More specifically, Quaglia pointed at the number of policy actors involved in the process and concluded that, going forward, there could be some ‘lack of clarity as to who is responsible’.

Professor Quaglia also examined the intricacies of the UK’s position on the EU Banking Union. Going beyond the obvious political reason why the UK is not part of the Banking Union (the UK decided not to join EMU in 1999), she also underscored the chief importance of economic factors and in particular the structure of the EU banking system in explaining the reluctance of the UK to join the SRM: the UK’s banking system ‘is a system that is very internationalized rather than just Europeanized’.

Putting things in the larger perspective of open economies facing interdependence pressures, Lucia Quaglia went on and explained that ‘by and large, all countries regardless whether they are in the euro area or even in the European Union, face what some economists call a financial trilemma, between the stability of the financial sector, international financial integration and national policies for the regulation, resolution and supervision of banks’. An additional constraint for euro area countries, she added, is that ‘the lender of last resort is no longer at the national level but hasn’t really been moved to the EU level’.

See the full interview here: http://fbf.eui.eu/lucia-quaglia-hints-at-a-convoluted-decision-making-process-on-banking-resolution/

Wednesday, 21 October 2015

Here’s what Britons really want David Cameron to get from Brussels

The victory of the Conservatives in the 2015 UK parliamentary election has paved the way for a referendum on the UK’s EU membership by 2017. British Prime Minister David Cameron has a mandate to hold the referendum on the question of whether Britain should remain a member of the EU.

Prior to the referendum, Cameron is expected to renegotiate the UK’s place in the EU on a number of key issues, which include giving greater powers to national parliaments, cutting red tape, an opt-out for Britain from the principle of ever-closer union, and restrictions to welfare entitlements of EU migrants. Britain’s place in the EU is now one of the most important questions in British politics.
 
But how Eurosceptic is the British public? Research I carried out recently on British attitudes towards the EU and which is presented on the Policy Network website suggests that there is great variation not only on how much power Britons want to give to the EU but also in their support for specific policy areas.
 
Somewhat against expectation, there is a substantive section of the population that supports a greater role for the EU in all EU policy areas. About a quarter of respondents on average also neither agree nor disagree with the statement that the EU should have more authority over the EU member states in specific policy areas, which suggests that they are broadly happy with the current levels of integration.

The British public tends to support a greater role for the EU in policies that are perceived to be optimal for all countries involved, such as trade and the digital economy. They also support integration in policies such as environment and climate change, which by their nature require international cooperation. They tend to oppose further integration in social policies, such as labour market, employment and social affairs, education and health, as well as economic and monetary policies, which are perceived to belong to the realm of the nation state.

Britons are reluctant to support policies that entail a level of redistribution across the EU that goes beyond traditional EU funding, such as EU citizens’ right to work and access to the welfare state of another EU country. Only 27 per cent of respondents disagree with the statement that the right of EU citizens to work in other EU countries should be restricted; 17 per cent neither agree nor disagree with the statement, while over half of the respondents (56 per cent) think that this right should be restricted (although to varying degrees). The overwhelming majority of respondents (73 per cent) agree that EU citizens should be allowed to receive welfare benefits only in their country of origin, and only 13 per cent disagree with this statement.

This is problematic as opposition to free labour movement infringes upon a fundamental EU principle. Changing this may require a full EU treaty change, which is unlikely to occur by 2017. Consistent with previous research, opposition to EU citizens’ right to work in another EU country derives primarily from older, less educated and working-class citizens, who may feel threatened by such mobility. UK Independence party and Conservative party supporters tend to be less supportive of free movement of labour within the EU.

Britons tend to have a utilitarian perspective on their country’s EU membership as they support policies where no one is perceived to be worse off as a result of European integration, and they tend to agree that Britain has benefited from being a member of the EU. Yet, the EU also provokes emotive reactions among British citizens, which range from uneasiness to hopefulness and to indifference.
 
UK government contributions to the EU budget
UK government contributions to the EU budget  Photo: HM TREASURY

When asked to describe their feelings about Britain’s membership of the EU, almost half of respondents reported that they felt uneasy about it. Other negative emotions that the EU provokes are anger (18 per cent), fear (16 per cent) and disgust (15 per cent). Quite strikingly, a quarter also feels indifferent, which indicates that this pool of voters may not turn out to vote; or if they do turn out to vote, they might decide how to vote quite late. In addition, although on average the EU provokes less positive emotions, data suggest that a quarter of the respondents feel hopeful about Britain’s membership of the EU.

This suggests that there is a clash between interest-based rational thinking and emotional attitudes to Britain’s EU membership. Beyond economic calculations, emotional reactions may be central to determining the outcome of the forthcoming referendum. There is room for media and political campaigns to tap into people’s emotions, especially when it comes to uneasiness and fear, as people expressing these emotions may be more prone to changing their opinion on the EU as a result of exposure to information.

This is even more important now that Jeremy Corbyn has been elected as Labour party leader. His ambivalent view on the EU is revealing disagreements within the party and may contribute to further dividing public opinion.

This piece by Dr Sofia Vasilopoulou, Lecturer in Politics at the University of York and an awardee of ESRC's UK in a Changing Europe programme, was originally published in The Daily Telegraph

Monday, 5 October 2015

The curse of polarised politics in Catalonia

Dr Sandra Leon has published a blog piece about the Catalan election "The curse of polarised politics in Catalonia". Read the full blog here: http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog/curse-polarised-politics-catalonia