Martin Smith (Anniversary Professor of Politics at the University of York) and Dave Richards (Professor of Public Policy at the University of Manchester) on Tony Benn's time in Government.
Much has recently been written about the legacy of Tony Benn - his campaigning efforts, the effect he had on both the Labour Party and the wider political landscape especially during the onset of Thatcherism and finally of course his diary writing. Less though has been said about his time in Government, where in many ways it could be argued he failed to fully use the opportunities presented to him as a holder of ministerial office. At the same time, Benn’s experience in government, particularly in the 1970s, reveals how officials could thwart a radical minister in the wake of behaviour they regarded as falling outwith the accepted Whitehall rules. Crucially, the lessons of Benn’s time in Cabinet illustrates that if a minister fails to build alliances with either ministerial colleagues or department officials, he or she is unlikely to be effective in making policy. The commentary below draws on extensive interviews conducted two decades ago with Benn, his Cabinet colleagues and various officials who served under him.
During the
1974-9 Labour Administration, Benn served as Secretary of State for Industry
(‘74-5) and subsequently Energy (‘75-9) and was intent on implementing Labour’s
manifesto. However, a combination of officials and political opponent’s
effectively thwarted his attempts to be a socialist Secretary of State. What is perhaps most striking is the explicit
ways in which senior civil servants were prepared to defy their minister, but
also how Benn afforded them the opportunity to break the normally symbiotic
relationship between the two by refusing to trust departmental officials. Benn’s time in office illustrates the extent
to which officials were tied to the post-war consensus and how they could
attach their loyalty to the Prime Minister rather than their own minister. Benn refused to play to the informal ‘rules
of the game’ vis-à-vis his colleagues or the Civil Service and this
created the opportunity for officials to seek to block his goals while claiming
a legitimacy underpinned their actions.
The
breakdown in these relationships reflected both Benn and his commitment to
socialism and the conservative nature of the British establishment. Benn
felt that the Civil Service would serve ministers effectively only if they did
not rock the boat. He argued that Whitehall’s
outlook was: ‘...that the continuity of government works within the Department
and then people come in and stay for a year or two in the bridal suite in the
Grand Hotel and they still run it. It’s
you job not to get angry about that but to shift it’.
Benn suggested that the Civil
Service did not like the fact that he wanted to implement the manifesto
commitments as stated, rather than adapt them to fit the departmental view. He recalled an early exchange with his
Permanent Secretary, Anthony Part in Industry:
‘“I take it you are not going to implement the manifesto”. He actually said it to me. I said, “You must be joking” and I circulated
the manifesto to all civil servants and told them, “That’s what we have been
elected to do”.’ Benn then argued that the term “Bennery” was: ‘invented either
by the Treasury or the Permanent Secretary of my department to try to stop me. They were feeding out all this Bennery’. Consequently, the trust which is crucial to
the civil servant-ministerial relationship was lost.
Benn’s approach broke three
cardinal rules of the Whitehall culture.
First, he did not trust his officials.
In the words of one former Industry official: ‘...he had reached the
view that the bureaucracy was against him, so it was an embattled
situation’. Second, he did not accept
the officials interpretation of the ‘facts’,
He rejected the idea that officials operated with a neutral sense of the
facts and working from within a socialist framework, he saw the official view
as having a ‘consensus-centred’ bias which was undermining rather than
supporting his policy goals. Third, in a
way that today is seen as much more of the norm, he looked to alternative
sources of advice. Because Benn did not
always trust his officials, he relied for policy support instead on both the
trade unions and his special advisors Frances Morrell and Francis Cripps. Benn regularly showed both his Civil Service
briefs to gauge their reaction, although, as one official (rather incredibly)
admitted: ‘It didn’t do him any good, because we immediately started writing
different kinds of briefs’.
One of Benn’s Industry officials
summed up the departmental view of Benn’s approach to office as being:
‘completely irrational’. From Benn’s
perspective: ‘the idea that the people at work had any right in policy making
was absolutely foreign to them (the Civil Service)’. Indeed, he was highlighting what was then an
important Whitehall norm that they are the
sole policy advisors. In the ensuing thirty years, the notion
of officials claiming a monopoly on policy advice has increasingly been
challenged, most recently of course by the Coalition’s commitment to Extended
Ministerial Offices. Yet, it is interesting that during Benn’s
time, officials saw it as ‘irrational’ and ‘extraordinary’ that a minister
would show briefs to outsiders and ask their views.
Elsewhere,
Benn recalled an occasion when Anthony Part his Permanent Secretary drafted a
paper which failed to reflect Benn’s view: ‘So I handed it to Frances Morrell
and Frances Cripps, and they drafted the papers. Then my Permanent Secretary went round all
the other Permanent Secretaries to try to get it stopped’. The use of advisors clearly challenged the department,
as one official observed: ‘[Benn] had these rather pernicious political
advisors and he discussed things with them and told them what he was doing and
what he wanted to do and so on, but he didn’t always tell officials, so it was
very difficult to know exactly what was happening.’
This air of
conflict was exacerbated by Benn’s reading of the rules of a minister,
combining two contradictory elements in his interpretation. On the one hand, he believed that he was
there to implement party policy and so, unlike most ministers, his legitimacy
derived not from Parliament or the Cabinet, but from the Party and the
manifesto. On the other hand, he
retained the constitutional notion of ministerial authority and responsibility;
he believed that officials should do what he told them to do. Generally, officials are culturally bound to
be loyal. But loyalty is offered in exchange for trust and involvement and,
because Benn excluded and distrusted his officials, and as he did not abide by
their rules, they withdrew their loyalty.
A former Industry official, who later went on to a very senior role in
Whitehall observed:
Other ideological [sic!]
ministers I’ve worked with...[Norman]
Tebbit and [Nicholas] Ridley for
example, and also [Keith] Joseph,
were sophisticated enough to see that bureaucrats are not against
ministers. And that bureaucrats when taken into confidence and
trusted will do their damnedest to deliver a radical programme.
In this sense, it could be argued that Benn threw away
his opportunity for radical reform by working against, rather than with, his
civil servants. Like another fellow
conviction politician, Margaret Thatcher [in her latter years], he ultimately
failed to recognise the dependency needed to make Whitehall work.
Benn’s problem with his civil
servants would not have been so difficult if he had sustained good relations
with the Cabinet and the Prime Minister.
However, this generally was not the case, allowing officials to justify
their disloyalty to Benn in terms of their loyalty to government as a whole
and, in doing so, draw upon the doctrine of ‘collective responsibility’. The argument of officials was that Benn was
not following policy collectively agreed by colleagues. Typically, one official said that Benn would
agree a line in a Cabinet committee and then argue against that position in
full Cabinet. Similarly, Anthony Part felt:
‘He worked inside the Department very much against his colleagues and against
Harold Wilson’. His former Cabinet
colleagues concurred. One claimed: ‘Benn
had one or two allies in the Cabinet but he was largely isolated. His contributions to Cabinet were always
nonsense but they did give us a good laugh’.
Another said his contribution had no clout in Cabinet: ‘...none at
all’. While Merlyn Rees rather
irreverently observed of Denis Healey’s reaction to Benn in Cabinet: ‘Denis
would sit there and Tony would go on and Denis’s view was a little bit like
that of Enoch [Powell], that the logic was good but the conclusions were balls.
Denis would say “And now here comes the bullshit”.’ Bereft of Prime Ministerial authority, there
was little Benn could do to bring his officials into line. Thus, in Civil
Service terms, officials were not undermining the rules of the game. To quote
one official:
Benn was not
thwarted exactly. He was subjected to a good deal of advice
which he found unwelcome. The job of the
Civil Service is, as best it can, to point out the realities of the situation
to ministers.
Despite the
formal constitutional position that ministers decide, without the support of officials
policy cannot be made. Benn’s approach
undermined the relationships of dependence which officials saw as crucial to
their professional integrity and self-image.
Benn also highlights the role of loyalty in official culture. Loyalty for officials is multi-faceted; they
are loyal to the corps of the Civil Service, to the government, to the
Department and to the minister. In this
sense, they always have conflicting loyalties.
On one side they have loyalty to their political masters - government
and ministers. This loyalty is part of
an important exchange relationship because without political support officials
cannot act. However, in the Benn case,
loyalty to the government and to a minister can conflict. Officials also have loyalty to the Civil
Service and their department. In the
Benn case, the argument of the officials was that they were being loyal to the
government. From Benn’s perspective, they were protecting departmental
interests. The case of Tony Benn reveals
how a minister can be isolated within Whitehall if he or she does not build the
relationship necessary for influencing policy.
Benn may have had a radical vision, but he also demonstrated strategic
naivety as a Cabinet minister in the face of bureaucratic resistance.
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