In advance of her international workshop, The Uses and Abuses of Political Apologies, Mihaela Mihai gives some background on state apologies for past injustices. What are state apologies? What are the validity conditions for such apologies? And what role do they play in democratic societies?
"It
is estimated that, between the 16th and the 19th
Centuries, Europeans traded approximately 8 million slaves out of Africa. Out
of this number, 2.5 million were transported on British ships. On the occasion
of the bicentenary of the 1807 Abolition of the Slave Trade Act, apologies by
the Anglican Church, by the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, and by the City
of Liverpool made it impossible for then Prime Minister Tony Blair to keep
silent. In an article published in the New Nation in
November 2006, and during subsequent commemoratory events at the Elmina castle
in Ghana, Blair controversially expressed “deep sorrow” over Britain’s
participation in the slave trade, a practice he equated with a crime against
humanity.
Apologies
by public figures are not exceptional today. The last few decades have
witnessed a sharp rise in the number of public and political apologies, so much
so that some scholars believe we are living in an “age of apology”. A gesture
formerly considered a sign of weakness, has grown to represent moral strength
and a crucial step towards potential reconciliation. Individuals, but more
often states, churches, the judiciary, the medical profession and universities
publicly issue apologies to those they have wronged in the past. Crimes ranging
from personal betrayals and insults all the way to enslavement, land
displacement, violations of treaties or international law, systemic
discrimination, wartime crimes, cultural disruptions, or political seizures
constitute reasons for public expressions of regret.
An international workshop examining state apologies for past injustices will takeplace at the University of York on the 6th of June. It comes at the
end of a project entitled When the State Says "Sorry": An Interdisciplinary and Comparative Approach to Political Apologies, sponsored
by the Government of Canada. The invited speakers will engage the following
questions: What are state apologies? What are the validity conditions for such apologies?
And what role do they play in democratic societies?
In
addressing the issue of state apologies, we can speak of three contexts:
domestic, international and postcolonial.
In the domestic realm, Canada’s
apology and compensation to Canadians of Chinese origin for the infamous
“Chinese Head Tax“ law and US’s apology and compensation for American citizens
of Japanese descent for the witch hunt they were subjected to during WW II are
relevant examples.
In the international realm we could discuss Japan’s “sorry”
for the abuse of Korean and Chinese “comfort women” and Belgium’s expression of
regret for not having intervened to prevent the genocide in Rwanda.
Finally, in
the postcolonial context, Australia’s and Canada’s apologies to their
Aboriginal communities for forced assimilation policies, Queen Elizabeth’s declaration
of “sorrow” for Britain’s treatment of the Maori community, and Guatemala’s
apology to a Mayan community constitute important illustrations.
In
interpersonal apologies an individual acknowledges and promises to redress
offences committed against another individual. While there is great variation among
authors on the number and exact role that different elements play within an
apology, there is a growing consensus that an authentic apology implies: an
acknowledgement that the incident in question did in fact occur and that it was
inappropriate; a recognition of responsibility for the act; the expression of
an attitude of regret and a feeling of remorse; and the declaration of an
intention to refrain from similar acts in the future.
When
applied to collective apologies for harms and wrongs featuring multiple
perpetrators – oftentimes committed a long time ago – most of the criteria for
valid interpersonal apologies don’t hold. Consequently, many have argued
against the very idea of collective apologies, and especially against the idea
of collective apologies for injustices that took place in the distant past.
Those
who want to recuperate the idea of a state apology for democratic politics
argue that we should give up the interpersonal model and think of collective
apologies politically. Thus, many have argued that
it is normatively sound to ascribe responsibility to collectives or
institutions as continuous in time and as transcending the particular
individuals constituting them at a certain moment.
In addition, it has been
pointed out that collectives are responsible for reproducing the culture that
made it possible for atrocities to go on uncontested for a long time.
Therefore, collective responsibility requires that political representatives
acknowledge the fact that an injustice has been committed, mark discontinuity
with the discriminatory practices of the past, and commit themselves to
non-repetition and redress.
At
this point, a caveat is necessary: collective responsibility must be
conceptually distinguished from collective guilt. For example, a present
government who has not committed any wrongs, can still take responsibility by
acknowledging that wrongs have been committed against a certain group or person
in the past, that it was “our culture” that enabled the abuses, that the abuses
have repercussions in the present, and that they will not be allowed to happen
again. A pledge to revise the very foundations on which the relations between
various groups are established within the polity, as well as material
compensations for the losses incurred by the victims give concreteness to the
apology.
In this sense, it can be safely said that collective apologies have
both a symbolic function (recognition of the offended group as worthy of
respect) and a utility function (the apology can be followed by reparations and
might lead to better inter-group relations).
Workshop details.
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